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Friedrich von Hayek:
The Socialist-Calculation Debate, Knowledge Arguments,
And Modern Economic Development
Cara Elliott

Introduction
At the close of the nineteenth and the commencement of the twentieth
century, socialism began to gain momentum as a large-scale movement in Europe
and the United States. This popularity was supported by an increased influence of
the working class in society, which put pressure for representation upon European
parliaments and began to secure concrete improvements in labor protection laws
(Backhouse, 2002: 269). Moreover, socialist proponents looked hopefully towards
the living example of the Soviet Union, which began its socialist experiment
in 1917 following the success of the Bolshevik Revolution. Socialism, which
found its economic grounding in the legacies of such men as David Ricardo and
Karl Marx, tended to encourage a more central and vital role for government
intervention in the economy. Thus economists who favored a socialist-oriented
change in contemporary societies began to develop theories intended to address
such issues as “where, when and how the state should intervene in economic life”
(Backhouse, 2002: 269) and how societies might be successfully reorganized so
as to be based upon these new precepts.
These developing theories contrasted with those of the opposition
contingent of both past and contemporary economists. As a result, a rich discourse
of opposing ideologies appeared in the early decades of the twentieth century,
coming from such men as Otto Neurath, Henry D. Dickinson, Maurice Dobb,
and Oskar Lange on the socialist side, and Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von
Hayek on the opposing. The debates, which focused on such subjects as the role
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of the competitive market, central planning boards, prices, and entrepreneurial
knowledge, were valuable to the participants not only in terms of their motives,
which were often political, but also in that the very nature of the debates
continuously challenged the economists and their theories. This encouraged
deeper analysis, understanding, and innovation in the theories developed by
economists on both sides of the dispute, allowing for stronger and more refined
arguments. Oskar Lange himself, when speaking about a challenge made to
socialist theories by Ludwig von Mises, wrote, “Socialists have certainly good
reason to be grateful to Professor Mises, the great advocatus diaboli of their
cause. For it was his powerful challenge that forced the socialists to recognize
the . . . very existence of . . . a problem [in the system]” (Lange, 1938: 57).
The theories that appeared at this time, especially with regards to Friedrich von
Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments,” caused significant intellectual reverberations
that continue to have implications in the socialist debate and economic discipline
as a whole in recent economic dialogues.
Hayek’s arguments are especially significant in their challenge to the
traditional neoclassical conception of static equilibrium and of perfectly
informed, uniform actors in a free-market economy that has “reached” this state
of equilibrium. Hayek’s contribution is in conceptualizing a dynamic, consistently
changing equilibrium that responds to and thus account more effectively the actions
of individuals in those economies. This conceptualization allows economists to
visualize and analyze market economies in a much more dynamic fashion and is
particularly vital with regards to the current state of affairs in free-market societies
worldwide. The world is in the midst of a charged atmosphere still experiencing
the shocks of the 2008 financial crisis, the essential collapse of countries such as
Greece and Ireland last year, and a generally pessimistic attitude about the ability
for Western, free-market economies, especially the United States, to continue to
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compete with countries experiencing growth at exponential rates, particularly
China, a country that continues to follow a socialist model – albeit an evolved,
complex one. The significance of Hayek’s arguments will not be in their ability to
be any sort of band-aid to solve the Western world’s problems. However, they are
also challenging, thought-provoking, and non-traditional arguments which could
exist in a larger forum of debate and exchange that focuses upon forward-thinking
economic theories that could help to revitalize stagnant or struggling free-market
economies in the modern world.
This paper will explore, first, the “socialist-calculation debate” of the
early decades of the twentieth century between such scholars as Ludwig von
Mises, Oskar Lange, and Friedrich von Hayek. One product of that debate was
Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments,” which will be the second topic of focus in the
paper. Finally, the third section of the paper will demonstrate different examples
of theories developed in various economics circles in recent years, with special
attention to those who claim foundation in Hayek’s work. These papers studied
in this section include Israel M. Kirzner’s “Entrepreneurial Discovery and the
Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach” (1997) and Fikret Adaman
and Pat Devine’s “On the Economic Theory of Socialism” (1997).

The Socialist-Calculation Debate
The Socialist-Calculation Debate, consisting of a series of arguments on
the subject of the “possibility of a rational economic calculation in a socialist
economic system” (Adaman and Devine, 1997: 55), opened with Enrico Barone’s
1908 paper “The Ministry of Production in the Collectivist State,” which outlined
a mathematical model for a collectivist state, and continued into the 1920s and
1930s with the opposing literature of the Austrian and Socialist schools (Adaman
and Devine, 1997: 55).
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German Literature, 1920s
In 1920, Ludwig von Mises began the “German-language” segment of
the debate with his “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,”
originally published in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften 1920, which challenged
a number of proposed socialist models (Mises, 1972: 75-91). Mises sought to
respond especially to Otto Neurath, who had written a paper in 1919 outlining
a calculation theory based upon the example given by “war economy.” Neurath
argued that during wartime, government assumes responsibility for the planning
of material distribution, suppressing the market price system characteristic of
peacetime. Moreover, production in wartime is not profit-seeking – which “leads
to recurrent periods of over-production and unemployment” (Caldwell, 1997:
1859) – but rather works to achieve maximum productive capacity. Neurath
asserted that the “central planning” that occurred during war should continue
during peace, with the government acting as a central “giant enterprise” (Caldwell,
1997: 1859). He then went so far as to argue that money would be unnecessary in
this new society in which “production would be driven by objectively determined
needs rather than the search for profits . . . [and] all calculation regarding the
appropriate levels of inputs and output could be handled in ‘natural’ physical
terms” (Caldwell, 1997: 1859).
Mises, a monetary theorist, especially disagreed with Neurath in terms of
his plans for the dissolution of the monetary system, mentioning that, as money
serves as a uniform means of exchange across different factors of production, “for
the practical purposes of life monetary calculation always suffices. Were we to
dispense with it, any economic system of calculation would become absolutely
impossible” (Mises, 1972: 79). However, he also hoped to outline an obstacle for
the conceptualization of the socialist order with or without the existence of money,
so his response to Neurath went on to provide a model in which socialist states’
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ownership of capital, or factors of production, was assumed, therefore negating
any competitive market for these goods. Mises saw this inclination as making it
difficult, or perhaps impossible, for socialist states to assign value to inputs, and,
thus, outputs (Caldwell, 1997: 1859). Essentially, without a competitive market,
which, through the processes of supply and demand naturally and continuously
determines prices and acts as an economic calculator of sorts, Mises argued, “in the
socialist commonwealth every economic change becomes an undertaking whose
success can be neither appraised in advance nor later retrospectively determined.
There is only groping in the dark. Socialism is the abolition of rational economy”
(Mises, 1972: 80).

English Literature, 1930s
In the following decade, partly in response to a popular shift towards
socialist thought that occurred in Britain as demonstrated by a variety of groups,
including political and labor parties as well as academics (Caldwell, 1997: 185960), English literature took up the debate. Friedrich von Hayek, who was at the
forefront of this movement, built and elaborated upon arguments begun by Ludwig
von Mises during the 1920s and formulated a series of critiques of socialism,
addressing in his works the arguments of such men as Henry D. Dickinson and
Maurice Dobb, and later, Oskar Lange. One of Hayek’s first obstacles was to
tackle Dickinson’s proposal of the possibility of mathematical calculation to
determine values in a socialist society through the employment of Léon Walras’
system of equations and the utilization of the “auctioneer.” In Dickinson’s plan,
a central planning board using this “Walrasian set of equations” would take on
the function of the market as the determinant of prices (Caldwell, 1997: 1860).
Hayek, in response, outlined a variety of issues with Dickinson’s system: first,
the collection and processing of large amounts of necessary information; second,
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the difficulty associated with formulating and solving the required equations;
and, third, the static nature of such a system and its inability to compete with the
natural adaptations of a free market (Caldwell, 1997: 1860).
Hayek continued this trend of underlining the difficulties associated with
suggested socialist solutions in his critique of Maurice Dobb’s contention that “if
consumption decisions were subjected to central control, most of the problems
associated with central planning would be alleviated” (Caldwell, 1997: 1861).
Hayek rejected this claim, arguing that this change would likely be unacceptable
to a society such as Great Britain, or others like it, which was accustomed to
a system of consumer freedom. Also in this critique, Hayek addressed “market
socialism,” which had not been concretely proposed as yet but was in theory an
alternative to what its adherents saw as a distorted capitalist system, in which
the market was no longer truly free or competitive, but rather dominated by
corporations and monopolies (Caldwell, 1997: 1861). By imagining a system
in which “managers of monopolized industries [would be] directed to produce
so that prices covered marginal costs . . . duplicating the results of competitive
equilibrium,” (Caldwell, 1997: 1861) Hayek addressed a few issues which,
at that point, were rather underdeveloped, but which he would go on to better
conceptualize in his later works. These obstacles were the difficulty for a socialist
order to replace entrepreneurs acting in a free market, and the issue of managerial
incentives in a society that was not profit-oriented (Caldwell, 1997: 1861).

The Lange Debates On Market Socialism
Oskar Lange, a Polish immigrant based in the United States, also wrote
on the subject of market socialism; however, he acted as its ardent advocate,
entering the discourse during the latter half of the 1930s to respond first to Mises
and later to Hayek. In his paper “On the Economic Theory of Socialism,” first
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published in Review of Economic Studies in 1936-7, and again as a book in 1938,
Lange’s framework proposed a free market for both consumer goods and labor
in conjunction with public ownership of capital and other means of production,
which he argued would reduce – although not eliminate – social gaps, given the
lack of income disparity that originates in private capital ownership (Lange, 1972:
92-3). Lange’s model required given prices determined by a Central Planning
Board so as to allow for a “subjective equilibrium condition” in which there
is a “combination of factors which minimizes average cost, [a level of] output
which equalizes marginal cost and the price of the product, and the best allocation
of the ultimate productive resources” (Lange, 1972: 97). Lange’s model then
necessarily rejected Mises’ argument that the market must be the determinant of
prices, arguing instead that the “parametric function of prices” which occurs in
competitive markets is retained in a system of fixed prices (Lange, 1972: 98-9).
Lange’s paper also addressed and refuted Hayek’s computation argument (in
which Hayek outlined the difficulty of computation given the breadth of required
information for equations and subsequent issue of solving those equations).
Lange claimed that “the only equations which would have to be ‘solved’ would
be those of the consumers and the managers of production” whereby, to solve
these equations, consumers need only to spend their income and managers of
production need only to produce at those levels determined by the equilibrium
requirements as previously defined in this section (Lange, 1972: 103). Moreover,
those prices required by the managers of production to determine their production
levels should be subject to a “trial and error” method of adjustment for price
finding, in which the prices are raised or lowered according to whether there is a
surplus or shortage of their respective goods. Given their broader knowledge base
and attention to the market, Lange believed the Central Planning Board setting the
prices and making the necessary adjustments would actually be better suited for
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this role than private entrepreneurs, allowing for a shorter process of movement
towards equilibrium than occurred the competitive market (Lange, 1972: 103104).
While Mises never explicitly responded to Lange’s challenge, he continued
to reject socialist proposals in his writings, focusing on refuting the socialist
proposition of a centrally planned mechanism for determining prices. He saw
prices as having a very specific determinant; that is, “‘[prices are] brought
about by the interplay of the valuations of all individuals participating in the
operation of the market’” (Mises, 1966: 331, cf. Caldwell, 1997: 1863). This
entrepreneurially-based scope allowed for an adaptive market that socialism
simply could not reproduce as “the ever-changing structure of prices that exists
within a market system, the messy groping that appears so archaic, ends up
being a passably efficient system for revealing relative scarcities” (Caldwell,
1997: 1863). In this system, the entrepreneur is “the essential actor of the piece”
(Caldwell, 1997: 1863) reacting to and, in fact, causing changes in the market;
for example, “where shortages have existed . . . the resulting price increases
[are] driven by entrepreneurs recognizing, in the face of the uncertainty of the
real world, the profit opportunities available” (Kirzner, 1997: 70). According to
Mises, the competitive market system, which tends to include explicit private
property laws and a propensity towards profit-maximizing actions, is a necessary
prerequisite to the role of Mises’ entrepreneur, therefore, in socialist economies,
the equilibrating actions of the entrepreneur would be null and void.
Hayek, like Mises, continued to write arguments against socialist systems,
and, in his own response to Lange, not only made use of his earlier addressed
objections to the mathematical calculation system proposed by Dickinson, but also
outlined new issues, such as the nature of equilibrium and the role of knowledge
in the market.
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Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments
Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments,” a series of papers published in the
late 1930s and throughout the 1940s, explored the nature of equilibrium and
especially the process by which that state is reached, and, in so doing, issued a
challenge to both traditional assumptions about static equilibrium and socialist
theorists. His argument focused on the role of knowledge in competitive markets,
responding directly to Lange’s contention that a Central Planning Board would
better determine prices than individuals participating in a naturally fluctuating
free market. Many scholars have asserted that the arguments presented in these
pieces were “seminal . . . both in development of Hayek’s ideas and in [their]
implications for the calculation debate” (Caldwell, 1997: 1865). His ideas were
first presented in his 1937 “Economics and Knowledge,” and were further refined
and developed in later works such as his 1945 “The Use of Knowledge in Society.”

“Economics and Knowledge,” 1937
“Economics and Knowledge,” which was featured in a 1937 issue of
Economica, sought to outline a more definite and clear concept of equilibrium.
Essential to this concept was Hayek’s departure from a “pure theory of stationary
equilibrium,” which neither accounts for change nor for time and also assumes
uniform, perfect knowledge among individuals, making the models based upon
these premises inapplicable to real world situations. Hayek’s study of knowledge,
denoted as “data,” begins with a distinction between “objective real facts, as the
observing economist is supposed to know them,” and “subjective [data] as things
known to the persons whose behavior we try to explain” (Hayek, 1937: 39).
Thus, a state of equilibrium only lasts so long as the “external data correspond to
the common experiences of all the members of the society” (Hayek, 1937: 41).
Understanding equilibrium in this manner breaks the restraints of stationary models
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and allows for equilibrium analysis to be applied to more realistic, “progressive”
society. Also important to this line of argument, however, is Hayek’s careful
mention that his distinction does not intend to imply that there is not a relationship
between subjective data, or individual plans, and objective data, or external facts.
Rather, “subjective data of different people [would never] correspond unless they
were due to the experience of the same objective facts” (Hayek, 1937: 43).
Furthermore, this correspondence of knowledge and intentions by
entrepreneurs in the market as Hayek understands it is an evolutionary process
with a consistent tendency towards equilibrium as economic actors “come more
and more into agreement . . . [or] become more and more correct” (Hayek, 1937:
44). This tendency, (which does not necessarily ever lead to an absolute state
of equilibrium) or the process “by which individual knowledge is changed,” is
Hayek’s next subject. He asserts that economists should remember “how little
we actually know about the conditions under which an equilibrium will ever be
reached” (Hayek, 1937: 48). This limitation derives from a “‘constancy of the
data’” as a condition of equilibrium. This constancy does not exist in the real world,
as individuals consistently change their expectations and subsequent actions “as
they gain experience about the external facts and other people’s actions,” leading
to a continuous and seemingly infinite process of changes (Hayek, 1937: 47-8).
While this process is of interest to Hayek, it is in the ensuing analysis of
the nature of knowledge – “how much and what sort different individuals possess”
– that his most interesting insights come to light (Hayek, 1937: 48). He begins
by assuming individually “‘relevant knowledge,’” which, when taken together,
allow for a “spontaneous interaction of a number of people, each possessing only
bits of knowledge, [to] bring about a state of affairs in which prices correspond
to costs” – in other words, a “Division of Knowledge” similar in function to the
much-studied division of labor (Hayek, 1937: 49, emphasis in the original). This
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knowledge, is, again, consistently changing as individuals become aware of new
facts. It is a learning process that may occur either completely by accident or
through the unexpected results of any executed action. Therefore, “it is only
relative to the knowledge which a person is bound to acquire in the course of the
carrying out of his original plan and its successive alteration that an equilibrium
is likely to be reached” (Hayek, 1937: 51). In other words, Hayek argued that a
greater understanding and, moreover, refinement of this “division of knowledge”
theory would allow for economists to better comprehend the equilibrating nature
of the market. Hayek saw this issue as the
central question of all social sciences, how the combination of fragments
of knowledge existing in different minds can bring about results which,
if they were to be brought about deliberately, would require a knowledge
on the part of the directing mind which no single person can possess. To
show that in this sense the spontaneous action of individuals will under
conditions which we can define bring about a distribution of resources
which can be understood as if it were made according to a single plan,
although nobody has planned it, seems to me indeed an answer to the
problem which has sometimes been metaphorically described as that of
the ‘social mind’ (Hayek, 1937: 52).
Hayek concludes that, economists, then, should attempt to find a way to
deliberately put to use all of this knowledge so as to better fathom the evolutionary
process of equilibrium and to formulate a model which would, in application,
allow for a closer state of absolute equilibrium than present models and states.
Hayek continued to refine these theories in the next few years of his career, and
thus Hayek’s later work, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” delves deeper into,
and therefore more clearly expresses, the arguments formed in the 1937 paper.

“The Use of Knowledge In Society,” 1945
Published in the fall 1945 issue of The American Economic Review,
“The Use of Knowledge in Society” begins by asking the question, “What
is the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational economic
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order?” (Hayek, 1945: 519). Hayek, in contrast to the traditional practice of
seeking to solve this economic calculation problem by employing a system of
given preferences and perfect knowledge, underscores that a proposed calculation
which at least attempts to be applicable to society must make use of the “dispersed
bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate
individuals possess” (Hayek, 1945: 519). This problem naturally deals with the
concept of planning – in the traditional definition of the word, taken to mean the
decisions pertaining to the allocation of resources within a society – and, more
specifically, the “planners” making those decisions. The debate, then, over the
advantages of either central planning, in which there is one plan determined from
above, or competition, in which there is decentralized planning by many different
individuals acting in the market, should be resolved by answering the question
of which system makes better use of this dispersed knowledge. In order to make
this determination, a better definition of the different kinds knowledge and their
relative significances is required.
Hayek differentiates between scientific knowledge and tacit knowledge,
defining the former as “those which we should with greater confidence expect to
find in the possession of an authority made up of suitably chosen experts” and
the latter as “more likely to be at the disposal of particular individuals . . . the
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” (Hayek, 1945: 521).
While greater emphasis is generally placed upon scientific knowledge, Hayek
argues that tacit knowledge should hold equal import given that “practically
every individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique
information of which beneficial use might be made” (Hayek, 1945: 522). This
information is formed by way of a wide array of sources, such as popular or
localized publications or advertisements; isolated interactions between
entrepreneurs; or individual desires – all “special knowledge of circumstances of
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the fleeting moment not known to others” (Hayek, 1945: 522). Moreover, through
the process of acting in the competitive market, knowledge is consistently and
continuously changing, constituting an ongoing discovery process. The nature of
tacit knowledge, then, is such that it cannot be expressed numerically, making it
impossible to integrate in a calculation-based socialist order, while at the same
time acting as a natural component of a responsive capitalist system (Hayek,
1945: 524).
The second half of Hayek’s 1945 paper focuses upon arguments in support
of the price mechanism. Hayek argues that prices function not only a medium of
exchange but also as a conveyor of information. They are a “kind of machinery for
registering change, or a system of telecommunications which enables individual
producers to watch merely the movement of a few pointers . . . in order to adjust
their activities to changes of which they may never know more than is reflected in
the price movement” (Hayek, 1945: 527). The nature of the price mechanism is
one the primary tenets of Hayek’s argument against those who would advocate for
“‘conscious direction,’” (central planners or socialist economists) because one of
the most miraculous features of the price mechanism is that it has “evolved without
design” (Hayek, 1945: 527). In this sense, it is one of many social institutions
which could not be instantaneously replicated, or worse, replaced with different
systems, because they exist as part of an evolutionary process consisting of many
generations of improvements and development in which success is achieved “by
building upon habits and institutions which have proved successful in their own
sphere and which have in turn become the foundation of the civilization we have
built up . . . [having originally] stumbled upon [them] without understanding”
(Hayek, 1945: 528).
From Hayek’s perspective, then, the socialist proposal was doomed
from the start, because it intended to transform society at its very roots, therefore
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undermining and, in fact, nullifying those evolutionary processes Hayek outlined.
The contemporary implications of Hayek’s “Knowledge Arguments” were
therefore not small; he underscored an issue for both mainstream and alternative
school proponents by challenging traditional equilibrium assumptions as well as
outlining a system in which the applicability and efficiency of socialist models
could not compare to competitive market processes which encouraged the best
utilization of dispersed knowledge. The exact nature and significance of these
implications continue to be debated and built upon in modern economic circles.
Modern Implications of the Knowledge Arguments
The concepts expressed in Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments – dispersed
knowledge among individuals; the discovery process surrounding that knowledge
in a competitive market setting; the nature and role of tacit knowledge; and the
function of prices as conveyors of information about the market – have been
significant in different ways for different schools of modern economists.

The Austrian School
The modern Austrian school’s conceptualization of the market is
influenced by both Mises’ lesson of the market being driven by profit-oriented
entrepreneurs as well as Hayek’s contribution of an understanding of the role,
nature and continuous augmentation of knowledge in the market (Kirnzer,
1997: 67). Additionally, Austrians have learned to appreciate the function of
competition with regards Hayek’s discovery procedure in that “for the modern
Austrian approach, this perception of competition as the dynamic, driving force
for discovery in the market process has become central” (Kirzner, 1997: 69). The
Austrian School, then, represents a break with standard neoclassical economics
in that the Austrians do not see the static equilibrium model that focuses its
interest on the endpoint as being sufficient to explain or understand what happens
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in actual market economies. Moreover, while neoclassical economics no longer
tends to adhere to the time-honored assumption of perfect information, it has done
comparatively little to address the role of the discovery process as outlined in
Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments.
In this sense, the Austrian school’s work exists as the most orthodox
modern application of Hayek’s theories, as Hayek’s “idea that ‘the pure theory
of stationary equilibrium’ is inadequate as a tool for understanding the workings
of a market economy, and that it should be replaced by a view of the market
as a competitive-entrepreneurial process for the discovery and coordination of
knowledge, has become a central tenet of Austrian thought” (Caldwell, 1997:
1866). The Austrian school is the best representation of Hayek’s legacy within
modern economic circles, and it is the only school that employs Hayek’s arguments
together in understanding the market, equilibrium, and the processes behind each
of these phenomena.

The Socialist School
The Knowledge Arguments have been significant for modern socialist
economists as well, especially for those that have made attempts to reconcile
Hayek’s arguments with socialist systems. For example, in Fikret Adaman and
Pat Devine’s “On the Economic Theory of Socialism,” printed in a 1997 issue of
New Left Review, the authors advocate for a system of participatory planning, in
which “the values of individuals and collectives interact and shape one another
through a process of cooperation and negotiation . . . [enabling] tacit knowledge
to be articulated and economic life to be consciously controlled and coordinated”
(Adaman and Devine, 1997: 75). Their proposed model differentiates between
“market exchange” and “market forces,” in which market exchange is taken to
mean “‘transactions between buyers and sellers’” and market forces refers to
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“‘the process whereby changes are brought about in the underlying allocation of
resources, the relative size of different industries, the geographical distribution
of economic activity” (Devine, 1992: 79-80, cf. Adaman and Devine, 1997: 76).
Market exchange, then, encourages information to be generated through
the participation of individuals acting in the market, which then makes the best use
of existing productive capacity while also determining any necessary changes that
will need to be made in the structure of that capacity for better future usage. Market
forces, on the other hand, will not be incorporated into the participatory setting,
planned instead from above. Through this combination of free participation in the
market with planning from above, the authors attempt to express a model in which
Hayek’s concept of tacit knowledge can, in fact, be incorporated into a socialist
economy. The issue with this model is that Hayek’s concept of an individual acting
in the market resembles Mises’ profit-motivated entrepreneur, and so does not
tend, as in Adaman and Devine’s model, to “promote cooperation and recognition
of interdependent common interest” (Adaman and Devine, 1997: 78), but rather
makes choices that are motivated by profit (Kirzner, 1997: 78). This orientation
towards profit is the driving force behind Hayek’s discovery process, thus, while
Adaman and Devine’s system accounts for tacit knowledge, it still misses some
of Hayek’s main points.
Adaman and Devine, however, differ from many other socialist
economists in at least seeking to integrate Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments
into their models. There have been a variety of other socialist models recently
proposed which do not take into account the insights of Hayek’s work, especially
ignoring the role of tacit knowledge. One of these models is outlined in Pranab
Bardhan and John Roemer’s work, expressed in such papers as their 1992
“Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation,” which focuses on the issues of
calculation and motivation instead of knowledge, and, through a “bank-centric
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system of insider monitoring” seeks to solve the managerial motivation problem
(Bardhan and Roemer, 1992: 105). Echoing Oskar Lange’s claims, their system’s
“main bank and the group partners . . . have more “inside” information . . . [and]
are likely to be capable of detecting . . . trouble more easily than a diffuse body
of stockholders” (Bardhan and Roemer, 1992: 109). In this sense, Bardhan and
Roemer outline a model which may seem applicable to real world situations, but,
like Lange before them, do not account for the role of knowledge as expressed by
Hayek in their work. The differences between Adaman and Devine and Bardhan
and Roemer’s theories, which both exist in the realm of market socialist theories,
illustrate the nature of the debate that surrounds socialism today, even from within,
as socialist economists continue to search for a working model which accounts for
their opponents’ challenges.

Conclusion
Friedrich von Hayek’s Knowledge Arguments stand as both some of his
most insightful and significant work as well as noteworthy developments in the
greater scope of economic thought as a whole. They had implications both within
Hayek’s own contemporary economic circles, especially with regards to the
socialist-calculation debate, and continue to influence economic theorists today.
The propagation of Hayek’s concepts is particularly evident in the “alternative”
Austrian school of thought, which, like Hayek, challenges neoclassical standards
to move closer to real world situations so as to create applicable, working models
for market economies. Also notable, modern socialist economists such as Fikret
Adaman and Pat Devine have worked to address Hayek’s theories, attempting to
integrate at least some of the ideas into a workable socialist model.
This continuing debate mirrors that of the development of the Knowledge
Arguments themselves. Hayek was a key economist among those participating
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in the socialist-calculation debate, and, therefore, it follows that the Arguments
developed as a product of that debate, in one of his many attempts to challenge
his opponents. As Israel Kirzner maintains, the socialist-calculation debate was
a “catalyst in the development and articulation of the modern Austrian view as a
competitive-entrepreneurial process of discovery . . . it was through the give-andtake of this debate that the Austrians gradually refined their own position” (Kirzner,
1988: 1, cf. Lavoie, 1985, cf. Caldwell, 1997: 1861) In this sense, the evolution of
the Knowledge Arguments demonstrates a broader tendency of economists to rely
upon debates within and between different circles of thought to better develop
their theories and, ultimately, to come to a more complete understanding of the
world around them, and, more importantly, apply that understanding with the
hopes of improving that world.
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